

THE ARMY AND MULTINATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS:  
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

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## FOREWORD

Effectiveness in multinational peace operations has become an important issue for the Army. In addition to traditional peacekeeping to monitor cease-fires and truces, the Army is now involved in activities such as peace enforcement and the reconstruction of failed states. While the Army has well-established procedures for traditional peacekeeping, it clearly has much to analyze and learn about these new types of multinational peace operations.

As part of this process, the Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute sponsored two roundtables at the Army War College in 1993. Both brought together diverse experts from within and outside the government, and sought to clarify key questions and problems rather than provide definitive answers. To encourage frank and open discussion, the roundtables operated on a nonattribution basis.

The first roundtable examined grand strategy and foreign policy. It dealt with issues such as the future of the United Nations and U.S. objectives in Third World conflict. The second was at the level of military strategy and operations, focusing on the concerns of regional combatant commands and U.S. components in multinational forces. This is the report of the second roundtable.

This report is not a verbatim transcript of discussion at the roundtable, but an attempt to capture the essence of the debate and identify core issues which emerged. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this report as a contribution to the ongoing analysis of the Army role in multinational peace operations.

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## SUMMARY

Since current U.S. policy stresses multilateral peace operations, the military services are attempting to better understand this type of activity. To contribute to this process, the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army College and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute sponsored two roundtables in late 1993 which brought together experts from the strategic community. The first examined grand strategic issues; the second, problems of a regional combatant commander and the commander of the U.S. contingent of a multinational force. This is the report of the second roundtable.

Recent peace operations suggest a number of persistent problems:

- Dual loyalties, ulterior motives, hidden agendas, dual chains of command, and constrained terms of reference among the contingents in a multinational force;
- Weak understanding of Third World conflicts and wavering commitment on the part of the United States;
- The tendency of the United States to dominate a coalition once it is committed.

The roundtable participants considered changes in attitudes the most pressing task for the Army. Leaders must understand and value peace operations. Most of the roundtable's recommendations for U.S. commanders in peace operations concern intellectual challenges:

- Seek clarity concerning endstates, capabilities, parameters, rules of engagement, procedures, and objectives.
- Coordinate and synchronize with other national military contingents, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and U.N. headquarters before and during a crisis. Encourage the development of combined doctrine, procedures, and training.
- Understand the conflict using new methods of conflict assessment and planning.
- Understand national contingent capabilities and leaders' personalities.
- Institutionalize staff experience with peace operations.

Roundtable participants encouraged further analysis of key issues:

- Profile of successful multinational force commanders;
- The process of force structuring used by the United

Nations;

- The notion of "stand off" peace operations;
- Techniques to assess the resolvability of a conflict or its ripeness for resolution;
- Adequacy of the Joint Strategic Planning Process for multinational peace operations.

The roundtable focused on the concerns of a U.S. military commander anticipating near-term involvement in a peace operation. Full effectiveness, however, also depends on long-term changes. The ideas discussed at the roundtable suggest a program to improve Army support to multilateral peace operations. This would have four objectives:

- A healthy intellectual environment for improvements in understanding and capability;
- Assignment of top-quality personnel;
- Mature doctrine, planning procedures, and training;
- A holistic perspective.

## THE ARMY AND MULTINATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

### Introduction.

International cooperation to resolve crises can lessen the burden on the United States and disperse responsibility for global stability, thus leading to a more frugal national security strategy. Multinational peace operations, most under the aegis of the United Nations, have become one important form of such security cooperation. Current U.S. policy stresses multinational peace operations<sup>1</sup>. As a result, the military services are attempting to improve doctrine, training, and procedures. This first requires a deeper understanding of the problems associated with this type of activity.

Traditionally, peace operations are not a strong suit of the U.S. Army. With great deliberation, the modern Army was designed for warfighting. Unit for unit and individual for individual, it is probably the most effective land combat force in history, a finely honed tool for the use or threat of violence. Given the inherent difficulties of preserving this proficiency in a time of declining resources, it is easy to see multinational peace operations as a distraction. They demand time and money needed to retain warfighting skill and pose uncomfortable and difficult intellectual challenges. For some critics, it is simply unrealistic to expect a soldier to be both effective warfighter and talented peacemaker.<sup>2</sup>

Faced with these problems, many Army leaders might prefer to avoid multinational peace operations all together. Most, however, recognize their potential importance and are committed to increasing the Army's contribution. The key is preserving warfighting skill while augmenting effectiveness at peace operations. Warfighting and peace operations must not become alternatives but compatible and symbiotic techniques aimed at a common goal. To complete this union, Army leaders must fully understand peace operations, their potential and problems. This is not easy. Multinational peace operations themselves are changing rapidly, making old wisdom obsolete. Like any moving target, peace operations can be mastered, but only by deliberately developed skill.

During the cold war, United Nations peacekeeping did help resolve conflicts, but only under special conditions.<sup>3</sup> If the antagonists in a conflict were superpower clients or did not want outside intervention, the U.N. was helpless. For most Third World conflicts, stalemate in the Security Council prevented U.N. action and limited peacekeeping to the periphery of the international system. Only the dogged determination of U.N. officials and nations such as Canada, Austria, Australia and the Scandinavian countries gave peacekeeping any utility at all.

When the cold war ended, it seemed peacekeeping's utility would expand dramatically. As the United Nations successfully intervened in a spate of festering Third World conflicts, peacekeeping became a true growth industry. For every U.N. peacekeeping force deployed, there were two, three, or four other nations clamoring for multinational involvement. This change was also qualitative as traditional peacekeeping evolved into "second generation peace operations."<sup>4</sup> While traditional peacekeeping was usually monitoring of a negotiated cease-fire or truce by a neutral multinational force, second generation operations--championed by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali--included more intrusive actions such as coalition peace enforcement in violent environments and the attempted reconstruction of "failed states" facing what Andrew S. Natsios calls "complex humanitarian emergencies."<sup>5</sup> Reflecting changes in the notion of national sovereignty, coercive international intervention will likely remain an important element of the future security environment.<sup>6</sup>

This expansion and evolution of peacekeeping initially spawned great expectations. Optimists, both within and outside governments, considered multinational peace operations a panacea for Third World conflict, a model for mature cooperative security, and the fruition of dreams spun by U.N. founders. But as rapidly as these dizzy expectations emerged, they were shattered by failure in the Balkans and Somalia. Suddenly, the world community questioned the effectiveness of multinational peace operations and the Clinton administration--initially an ardent advocate of a more active U.N.--took a second, more critical, look.<sup>7</sup> With the demise of Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and the withdrawal of the nomination of Clinton confidant Morton Halperin to the post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Peacekeeping and Democracy, peace operations lost two of their strongest proponents.<sup>8</sup> While calls for U.N. involvement persisted among the conflict-ridden nations of the Third World, support from the rest of the world faded and 1993 became, according to Madeleine K. Albright, the U.N.'s "summer of discontent."<sup>9</sup>

Deflation of unrealistic expectations is often rapid and severe. This seems to hold for multinational peace operations. Driven by the horrors of Somalia and Bosnia, heady optimism disintegrated into debilitating pessimism.<sup>10</sup> But, as is frequently the case, extremism is misguided; the truth lies somewhere between euphoria and disillusionment. We now need a sober, realistic, and balanced examination of multinational peace operations. The world must understand that they cannot solve all conflict, but can be a useful adjunct to diplomacy and humanitarian relief. The key is to both understand the limitations of multinational peace operations and improve their effectiveness. The U.S. Army must play a role in this. The question is: How?

A full answer will take extensive study, debate and

analysis. To contribute to this process, the Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute brought together experts from the strategic community in two roundtables in late 1993. The first dealt with grand strategy, covering issues such as the future architecture of the international system and trends within the United Nations.<sup>11</sup> The second discussed the concerns of a commander of a regional combatant command (CINCPAC) supporting a multinational peace operation and the commander of the U.S. contingent of a multinational force. This is the report of the second roundtable.

Participants came from within the government and outside it (a participant list is an appendix to this report). To facilitate the free flow of ideas, discussion was non-attribution. This report is not a verbatim transcript of the proceedings, but an attempt to capture the issues raised and suggest some conclusions.

### **Morning Session: Case Studies.**

The recurring theme of the roundtable was the importance (and difficulty) of *cooperation* in multinational peace operations. Somalia, according to one participant, proves Ben Franklin's observation, "We must indeed all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately." Cooperation--between the military services, between the military and nonmilitary agencies, between government and nongovernment organizations, and among nations--may not guarantee success in an operation, but its absence nearly always assures failure.

This theme pervaded the morning session which discussed "lessons learned" from recent peace operations. The first topic was the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).<sup>12</sup> UNTAC's primary role was conducting the May 1993 elections. Since these occurred and led to a government with wide legitimacy, UNTAC is usually considered a success. Many humanitarian relief organizations, however, felt that UNTAC did little to repair Cambodia's infrastructure and prepare for sustained economic reconstruction. A participant suggested this overlooked the logical sequence of conflict resolution during peace operations. The United Nations had to first help create a legitimate government able to seek international reconstruction assistance. To ask a multinational peace force to monitor an election and cease-fire in a war-torn nation and simultaneously rebuild economic infrastructure is simply too much. Besides, UNTAC's mandate from the U.N. Security Council emphasized the elections, not infrastructure.

Like all multinational peace operations, UNTAC suffered from "dual loyalties." National contingents in multinational peace operations represent both the United Nations and their own country. They thus have two chains of command, one running to the multinational force commander and the other to their national

authorities. Problems arise when these two loyalties conflict. Cambodia showed that military leaders must recognize the motives and interests of participating states since these affect the capabilities and autonomy of national military contingents. Some contingents in Cambodia could not undertake risky actions without direct approval from their national authorities, thus affecting the missions they could be assigned. The terms of reference used by each national contingent may not be explicit or public. This forces headquarters planners to discover operational parameters through trial and error. As a result, terms of reference are as important as inherent military capabilities in determining how national contingents can be used by the force commander.

Similarly, national contingents may have hidden agendas or ulterior motives that only become clear over time. This is especially true of contingents from nations with direct political or economic interests in a conflict. The resulting problems cannot always be rectified before an operation. Additionally, the participation of a nation may be so politically important that the United Nations and the U.N. force commander accept highly constrained terms of reference.

Hidden agendas, ulterior motives, dual chains of command, and constrained terms of reference are more pervasive in a traditional peacekeeping operation such as Cambodia than in peace enforcement.<sup>13</sup> The closer a conflict is to outright war, the more hidden agendas, ulterior motives, and the like are sublimated to the good of the coalition. Thus partners in a warfighting coalition will accept U.S. dominance more readily than in a peacekeeping operation. The longer a conflict drags on, the less clear the ultimate goals, or the more complex the political motives of the participants in a multinational force, the more these problems will erode the effectiveness of the force.

Drawing multinational forces from states without vested interests in a conflict or region would minimize these problems, but, with the exception of a handful of traditional peacekeeping countries, disinterested states willing to undertake the human and economic burdens of peace operations are scarce. Force developers must often choose between knowledgeable soldiers from nations with a definite political agenda and politically disinterested but less knowledgeable ones. States familiar with a region, its habits, terrain, and politics, usually have a bias or vested national interest. Examples include the Slavic contingents involved in peace operations in the former Yugoslavia and the Italians in Somalia. Familiarizing uninterested national contingents with the peculiarities of a region is possible in traditional, slowly-developing peacekeeping, but difficult in faster-developing peace enforcement actions.

One reason nations contributing to a peacekeeping force often insist on U.S. involvement is that we generally lack geopolitical ambitions where such operations take place. This follows the old logic that a rich man should make an honest

politician because his wealth places him beyond corruption. An absence of geopolitical ambitions, however, does not always imply an absence of political bias. Equally, a lack of identifiable interests may also result in a weak level of American commitment and little staying power. Clearly, then, U.S. involvement is a mixed blessing. This even holds at the tactical level. While the United States may have no territorial aspirations in a Third World conflict, U.S. forces quickly become the center of attention, both positive and negative. Americans are thus vulnerable to hostage taking. If this occurs, the United States tends to turn the operation into a bilateral confrontation as in Somalia. To avoid such problems, multinational force commanders often attempt to multilateralize a hostage situation by immediately involving elements and individuals from nations other than that of the hostage. A force commander in a relatively slow-developing crisis can do this; it is more difficult in rapidly developing crises.

Among the reasons UNTAC succeeded was its focus on elections and avoidance of "mission creep"--the expansion of tasks and objectives beyond the original terms of reference. Mission creep could easily have occurred when the Khmer Rouge began obstructing the electoral process. Some members of UNTAC supported using force to enter Khmer Rouge-controlled areas. UNTAC decided, though, that the election could succeed anyway so there was no justification for asking the Security Council to expand the original mandate. Given such complex decisions and delicate balances, the UNTAC force commander General Sanderson was vital, especially in preserving the mission's focus following the Khmer Rouge's withdrawal from the electoral process. While Sanderson was the "right man at the right time," it is difficult to extrapolate any sort of general profile of a multinational force commander from one case. A comparative study of multinational force commanders would be useful.

Because of dual loyalties and vested interests, the Security Council and Secretary-General must be brutally frank in composing a multinational force. An assessment of the potential contribution of a nation must examine not only military capabilities, but also historic and political baggage. To ask Germany, for example, to participate in peace operations in the former Yugoslavia would be a political error. Although the Secretariat can assess political inclinations, an effective multinational military staff is needed to judge military aptitudes. Furthermore, combining political disinterest with specific regional knowledge suggests the need for a formal U.N. training program. This has often been discussed as a means to close the "capability/acceptability gap," but received little serious support from key organizations and states. A feasible first step would be construction of a basic data base of military capabilities to help the U.N. staff compose forces.

The conflict in Bosnia illustrates the U.S.' difficulty in understanding Third World conflict. The logic driving events

there might be twisted and complex, but is nonetheless clear. Our inability to frame a coherent Bosnia policy grows from a failure to understand the historic, political, and ethnic origin of the conflict.<sup>14</sup> The Bosnian war, after all, can be traced back 600 years. Similarly, negotiations between clans and factions in Somalia often swirl around events from half a century or more ago.

Luckily, most European leaders understand the complexities of the Balkan conflict, and serve as brakes on outside intervention. In this case, knowledge breeds caution. In fact, detailed understanding of a region may help identify truly unresolvable conflicts or, at least, ones not ripe for resolution.<sup>15</sup> Such knowledge must be provided to the Security Council so that it can assess when and where to intervene. It would be helpful if the Army could preserve and develop the analytical skills to provide sophisticated analysis of regional conflicts including frank assessments of the potential for conflict resolution. Foreign Area Officers would form the core of such effort. The result would be better advice to national security decisionmakers.

The opportunity to do this will arise again. Around the world, groups with distinct ethnic identities and traditional territories but without a history of statehood are seeking independence or autonomy. The former Soviet Union, in particular, is rife with such movements. Their pleas are emotionally powerful, but politically unresolvable. Any fragile states they create in conjunction with outside intervention will have difficulty surviving the withdrawal of peacekeeping or peace enforcement forces. There is a persistent danger, then, of overextending the U.N.'s peacekeeping capability despite urging of restraint from the United States and other member nations.

The real danger, however, may be less overextension by the United States than disillusionment. Americans simply do not care what happened decades or centuries ago in the Balkans or Somalia and certainly believe American soldiers should not be placed at risk because of ancient and incomprehensible grudges. The perception that many Third World antagonists lack a just or logical cause can generate frustration and fuel isolationism. The only buffer is solid leadership based on U.S. concern with the symbolism of violence. We seek an international system based on the peaceful resolution of conflict. Ethnic violence, if allowed to become normal and accepted behavior, challenges this. Even so, the world response to regional conflict based on primal identity should not be direct military intervention, but sanctions, blockades, and quarantines--"stand-off peacekeeping."

It is not clear that the United States can participate in a multinational peace operation without dominating it. One participant noted that in the Somalia operation, other members of the coalition were ambivalent about the appropriate American role.<sup>16</sup> Many wanted us only to provide logistics, communications,

and intelligence. Most Americans, though, feel the United States is obliged to lead peace operations even if they are not sure why. This is a direct reflection of a larger debate over the American purpose which pits those who see a special U.S. mission to construct a new world order against those who support a more limited foreign policy based on tangible national interests rather than systemic ideals.<sup>17</sup>

Given the fragility of American public support for peace operations, we must test potential crises for resolvability and political marketability. At the same time, the United States should, according to one roundtable participant, outgrow or transcend its obsession with casualties and admit that the ideals undergirding peace operations are worth certain costs. Small nations such as Ireland, Denmark, and Canada have long suffered casualties in peace operations without faltering support. American leaders must thus actively build support for peace operations. Still, there is a problem of balance. While few nations would be willing to provide peacekeepers if the United States refused, other nations tend to abdicate leadership when the United States becomes involved. This limits our ability to play a constrained role; the only options seem to be leadership or noninvolvement.

#### **Afternoon Session: Working Groups.**

During the afternoon session, working groups analyzed specific issues encountered in multinational peace operations. Each working group identified key problems, suggested solutions, and then reported back to the plenary session of the roundtable. The issues were: (1) planning procedures; (2) command and control; (3) interface among organizations and agencies; and, (4) conflict resolution and indicators of success.

#### **Planning Procedures.**

The first working group stressed that planning for peace operations must be interagency and multinational with contributions from the military, government political organs, and humanitarian organizations (both governmental and non-governmental). Clear strategic objectives are the foundation of sound planning, but in peace operations, objectives are always a composite blending those of the U.N. Security Council, nations participating in the operation, and other organizations. The U.N. Secretary-General can play a powerful role in shaping objectives and building consensus, but usually does not have goals separate from those of member states. This heterogeneity of political goals affects operations. Military planners must understand this as they complete an "estimate of the situation."

The working group then focused on five questions:

*Are existing planning procedures such as OPLANS and campaign*

*planning adequate for peace operations?* For purely military planning, existing procedures are adequate. Their utility declines during interagency planning where informal, even ad hoc procedures often prove most valuable. To link strategic and operational planning, the multinational force commander must be involved in the strategic-level planning that defines ultimate political objectives and structures the force--a role similar to that of a U.N. CINC. Strategic planning procedures are less useful. To be more effective in multinational peace operations, the United States should reevaluate the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), especially the apportionment of forces through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).<sup>18</sup> This may still be adequate, but its suitability in the post-cold war strategic setting should at least be analyzed.

*Should primary responsibility for U.S. planning rest with unified commands?* The unified commands--in conjunction with the Joint Staff--should be preeminent in military planning for peace operations. But, the CINC's planning staff must coordinate with humanitarian organizations. Diplomatic concerns enter the planning of unified commands through the CINC's political advisor (POLAD). Cooperation with humanitarian organizations is vital, but necessarily less formal and institutionalized. The goal should not simply be unity of purpose, but unity of effort. The unified command should have primary responsibility for all U.S. planning if the military is the leader of the operation. Currently, the unified commands vary widely in experience with peace operations. The Central Command (CENTCOM) has extensive expertise and skill at the interagency process derived from its involvement in Somalia and location in the continental United States. This is not always matched by the other unified commands. A better way to manage expertise across the Department of Defense is needed.

*What type of planning procedures do non-DOD agencies use?* Other government agencies do both strategic and situation-dependent planning but this is not closely coordinated between agencies. These organizations usually send out assessment teams to acquire basic information. The planning that results is resource-based. Organizations such as the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance of the Agency for International Development support other humanitarian organizations which, in turn, provide on-the-ground relief. There is an extensive audit trail to assure funds are used effectively, efficiently, and legally.

*What are the most common types of planning problems?* The core problems are not in the mechanics of planning, but in confusing lines of authority and inadequate coordination. These include:

- Lack of clearly defined objectives leading to an absence of clearly defined military missions.
- Lack of clearly defined political end-states or

definitions of success.

- Shortage of doctrine and expertise for deliberate planning.
- Confusion on lines of authority, and command and control, including the international law of peace operations.
- Absence of clear, widely understood U.S. national security strategy or policy on multinational peace operations; absence of a standing interagency planning group for peace operations.<sup>19</sup>
- Weak methods for coordination at all levels.

*What questions warrant further analysis?*


- Should we create a formal planning process for peace operations separate from the joint strategic planning process?
- Should the military be the lead agency in such a process?
- How effective is the National Security Council at integrating U.S. Government activity in peace operations? Can its effectiveness be improved?
- How can Department of Defense planning be harmonized with U.N. headquarters and various multinational forces?
- What is the appropriate role of regional organizations?
- How can the planning process be flexible yet prevent "mission creep" or "mission shrink"?
- What is the proper role for public opinion and the media?

### **Command and Control.**

This working group dealt with several key questions.

*What is the doctrinal chain of command for U.S. forces in a multinational peace operation?* The members of the working group found little guidance in existing doctrine, so they proposed a solution (Figure 1). This is similar to the command and control system used by all nations in multinational peace operations. The key characteristic is the dual chain of command running to the United Nations and to national authorities.

Recent reform proposals in the U.N. would place political representatives of the Secretary General at all levels of command. They would serve as "political commissars" detailed to a commander but responsible to the U.N. Secretariat. Resistance to this idea among member nations is an indication of ambivalence about strengthening the Secretary-General's ability to control




**Figure 1. Chain of Command for Multinational Peace Operations.**

peace operations.

The roundtable participants disagreed on the importance of the direct command link between military contingents and their national authorities. A participant with extensive experience in peace operations felt that this should be minimal and used for reporting rather than for actual command and control. When a contingent is deployed with a U.N. force, national authorities may withdraw it, but should not exercise daily command. Other participants felt that this was unrealistic. To ask a contingent commander to give greater weight to the U.N. than his national authorities is to expect him to disregard a lifetime of ingrained loyalties and obligations. The notion of a multinational force transcending national considerations is, at best, an ideal attainable only by the creation of a supra-national U.N. force. Support for such a force is limited among member states. For most member states, better a weak, dependent, and pliable U.N. than a stronger, autonomous one which might act against national interests. This tension between supra-national and nation concerns is a persistent one which will always flavor the decisions of a U.S. commander in peace operations.

The extent of command intervention by national authorities is determined by the clarity of the initial terms of reference.

If clear and coherent strategic objectives exist, national authorities will be willing to defer to the multinational force commander. If the terms of reference or strategic objectives are ambiguous or subject to disagreement, national authorities will retain closer control over their deployed forces. In addition, the operational environment affects the authority given a multinational force commander. When violence is limited, constraints on a force commander are minimal. As hostility escalates, the authority of the force commander declines. In peace enforcement operations which emulate war, the authority of the commander again rises. (See Figure 2.)



**Figure 2. Authority of a Multinational Force Commander.**

During recent peace operations contingents often waited for approval from national authorities before executing orders from the multinational force commander. This appears to be a new development arising from improved communications and changes in the political environment.

*What sort of C<sup>3</sup> problems occur between a U.S. contingent commander and multinational force commander?* Most problems stem from failure to craft an overall strategic concept for the operation. Other problems include:

- Difficulties caused when national contingents have greater C<sup>3</sup>I capability than higher headquarters. An American unit, for example, will nearly always have greater intelligence

capabilities than the rest of the multinational force combined. This gives the U.S. contingent more potential for autonomous activities and can generate strains between the contingent commander and the multinational force commander.

- National contingents may add conditions to the rules of engagement developed by the force commander.

- Language differences can generate misunderstandings, especially in the politically charged atmosphere of peace operations where nuances often take on great importance. This can be minimized by confirmatory memos and briefings as well as "repeat back communications" through which subordinate units repeat back directives and guidance to insure comprehension.

*What types of problems arise during the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence during peace operations?* The United Nations avoids the word "intelligence" since it connotes spying and other intrusive activities. Instead, it prefers "information." What most militaries mean by "intelligence," however, is not "information." A major problem for the United States is sanitization of intelligence for dissemination to other coalition partners. This must consider protection of sources and assets as well as political sensitivities. A force commander must also use information provided by nongovernment organizations (including the media) without compromising them or jeopardizing their security. To be more effective, the U.N. must overcome its discomfort with intelligence, especially in the type of enforcement operations described in Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. According to Richard Connaughton, these may not require developing an organic intelligence-gathering capability for the U.N., but rather greater intelligence sharing among the permanent members of the Security Council.<sup>20</sup> In any case, it will remain politically infeasible to collect strategic intelligence at U.N. headquarters. This means the U.N. must continue to rely on national suppliers for intelligence.

### **Interface.**

This working group considered the following questions:

*What are the procedures for improving coordination among U.S. Government agencies in a peace operation?* The first step is a clear sense of purpose, balancing objectives, strategies, and resources. The existing interagency process provides a foundation. Manuals and doctrine should be shared among agencies and each should have a dedicated group to concentrate expertise and experience. Interface should be permanent and continuing rather than periodic. At the level of grand strategy and national policy, the National Security Council should provide coordination.

*What are the procedures for encouraging coordination among the national contingents in a U.N. peacekeeping force?* The United States should send the best possible liaison personnel to work with other national contingents in a multinational force. The U.S. contingent commander must assure this. The United States should encourage the development of common doctrine and training among contingents likely to participate in a multinational force. Training is especially important. The Army has long recognized the warfighting value of combined arms training and, more recently, joint training. This should be applied to peace operations. Finally, the United States should demand mission clarification and explanation of the limitations on various national contingents at the outset of an operation. This will probably have to take place at U.N. headquarters rather than at the multinational force level.

*What are the procedures for encouraging coordination between a U.S. military contingent and nongovernment organizations during humanitarian relief operations?* This problem reflects the large number of relief organizations involved in a major operation. In Somalia, for example, there were 78. The military must better understand the needs and philosophies of nongovernment organizations and the functions of organizations such as the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance which links government and nongovernment organizations. Whenever possible, military operations should be subordinate to and complement diplomatic, political, and humanitarian efforts. Put in military terminology, humanitarian affairs are the primary effort and military activity the supporting effort in most peace operations. This requires a fundamental change in attitude since trained warfighters must understand that the ultimate objective of peace operations is not to seize, defend, or deter, but to save, sustain, and comfort.

In any peace operation, there will probably be nongovernmental humanitarian groups which reject cooperation with the military lest they be "tainted" or appear to lose neutrality. This cannot be avoided, but can be accommodated. Development of a permanent corps of peace operations experts within the military would ease cooperation with nongovernment agencies and organizations. While it is not clear how these experts should be identified, organized, and trained, we must, according to a roundtable participant, "not only *develop* experience, but *institutionalize* it."

Some roundtable participants were uncomfortable with the notion of subordinating the military to humanitarian relief organizations. While the two share interests, their objectives are not identical. The military is an element of U.S. national security policy, while nongovernment organizations, by definition, are not even when U.S.-Government financed. This means that subordinating military concerns to those of relief organizations might be a useful goal, but should not be an ironclad principle (and may entail legal complications). In some cases, lack of cooperation between military and humanitarian

organizations grows less from misunderstanding than a real divergence of purpose. This can be controlled, but not transcended. In fact, the most crucial distinction between the military and nongovernment humanitarian organizations is scope. Military involvement in peace operations should be limited and close-ended. That of humanitarian organizations should be long-term, aimed at permanent national reconstruction rather than short-term amelioration of conflict.

### **Conflict Resolution and Indicators of Success.**

This working group considered resumption of services such as electricity, mail, and a functioning legal and law enforcement system--important indicators of success. But, it might be countered, these services may not be "normal" in the type of states which require multinational peace operations. For much of the Third World, the normal level of corruption and inefficiency is higher than in developed nations. Thus normality as it exists in the developed world is not a useful indicator of success for a peace operation. In any case, the strategic endstate should be clarified before planners can develop indicators of success. This endstate should be a condition, not a date. In general, the indicator of success will vary from operation to operation, and is usually defined by the body or organization authorizing the mission.

### **Findings.**

The most pressing tasks for the Army are not changes in procedures, doctrine, force structure, organization, or training, but in *attitudes*. Army leaders at all echelons must understand peace operations. When peace operations are a valued part of the Army's function, then changes in procedures, doctrine, force structure, organization, and training will flow naturally and smoothly.

Following this, most of the roundtable's recommendations involve intellectual challenges. Specifically, U.S. commanders involved in peace operations should:

*Seek clarity* concerning endstates, capabilities, parameters, rules of engagement, procedures, and objectives.

*Coordinate and synchronize* with other national military contingents, government agencies, nongovernment organizations, and U.N. headquarters. The Department of Defense and military services should develop and practice methods of coordination before crises emerge. These can then be adapted to specific conditions and specific coalition partners. Pre-crisis combined training is vital. The roundtable participants did not discuss coordination with the intelligence community or with local authorities in a crisis area.

*Understand the conflict.* Any conflict involves a wide number of parties, each with distinct capabilities, objectives, and perspectives. Most conflicts represent the culmination of a long chain of events. The history of a conflict is thus germane to its present and future. Normal military procedures for the intelligence preparation of the battlefield do not provide guidelines for this type of assessment. This indicates a need for innovative methods of conflict assessment and planning.

*Understand contingent capabilities and leaders' personalities when building a force for peace operations.* The process of force structuring must consider the capabilities and limitations of each national contingent and its commander. Admittedly, building a force is more the task of the U.N. secretariat than an American CINC, but the regional understanding which exists in the staff of a unified command must be incorporated into the U.S. input to the force structuring process.

*Institutionalize peace operations experience at the staff level.* CINCs and the Joint Staff should consider forming permanent cells for planning peace operations. Since these would perform pre-crisis coordination as well as crisis planning, they should include representatives from all major staff directorates (J-1 through J-8) as well as political advisers.

The roundtable participants did not make recommendations for the training or composition of a U.S. force involved in peace operations. Nor did they consider the formation of dedicated units for peace operations.

A number of concepts and issues warrant further analysis:

- Profile of successful multinational force commanders.
- The process of force structuring used by the United Nations.
- The notion of "stand off" peace operations.
- Techniques to assess the resolvability of a conflict or its ripeness for resolution.
- Adequacy of the Joint Strategic Planning Process for multinational peace operations.
- Alternative formal planning systems

**Conclusion: A Program For Action.**

As our post-cold war national security strategy coalesces,

the United States may conclude that multinational peace operations are not as useful as they seemed in the heady days of the early 1990s. That is a decision for our top policymakers. Unless such a decision is made, the U.S. military should implement programs to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in multinational peace operations. As the service with the greatest traditional concern for peace operations, the Army should lead this process.<sup>21</sup>

The roundtable focused on issues and actions of interest to a U.S. commander preparing for a peace operation next month or next year. We must also consider the future. Ultimate effectiveness and efficiency depends on a long-term program for action. As part of this, the U.S. military should dedicate itself to four objectives, all attainable within a 5-year period:

*A healthy intellectual environment.* Senior leaders must take peace operations seriously. Skill and expertise--even if not the same as those required for warfighting--must be nurtured. Success in peace operations should be valued by promotion and command selection boards as much as success with large troop units. Peace operations must be debated throughout the military services, particularly within the Army. Healthy criticism of Army shortcomings should be encouraged. Creativity should be stressed rather than adherence to precedent. Peace operations should be exercised at the Army's combat training centers and form a vital part of the curricula of the military schools, from basic courses to the war colleges. Finally, the Army should actively and enthusiastically learn from other countries with experience in multinational peace operations.<sup>22</sup>

*Assignment of high quality personnel.* Assignments involving peace operations should receive a high priority. Those who serve successfully in these positions should be rewarded. Care should be taken that only top quality officers and soldiers work on peace operations, whether in staff positions or in the field. A highly skilled senior officer should be responsible for development and implementation of this program for action. Various staffs including the Joint Staff, the Army Staff, and the staffs of the unified and specified commands should develop permanent peace operations planning cells.

*Mature doctrine, planning procedures, and training.* Current doctrine--both Army specific and joint--is backward looking in that it focuses on traditional peacekeeping rather than second generation peace operations. It should be rebuilt from the ground up. The Army's FM 100-23 and Joint Pub 3-07.3 are good starts, but must be further developed. Planning procedures should imbue peace operations with the high degree of coordination required for success. These should be interagency as well as joint.<sup>23</sup> Training for peace operations should occur at all levels, including senior staff. There should be a regular program ranging from tactical field training to high-level staff exercises or, for lack of a better word, wargames. The growing simulation and

computer capability of the Army should be adapted to this. All training should be done in cooperation with other governmental agencies, nongovernment organizations, and other nations. Coordination should be a persistent characteristic of training, not a program. Since such training would create a new demand for scarce resources, a macro-level analysis should proceed any requirement to increase peace operations training.

*A holistic perspective.* The military should take the lead in developing common perspectives and procedures with other government agencies and nongovernment groups. Even though not the lead organization in peace operations, the military does, through joint and combined efforts, have considerable institutional experience at complex cooperation. This is translatable to peace operations. A system of military liaisons or seconded officers should be developed to work with nonmilitary organizations and nongovernment groups. To cultivate these ties, there should be a coherently designed series of studies, publications, conferences, and symposia co-organized and coauthored by representatives of the military and nonmilitary organizations.

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Peace operations and warfighting may seem diametric. In fact, they are inextricably linked. The U.S. Army has long accepted the value of deterrence for avoiding full-scale war and preserving national security. It must now recognize that multinational peace operations fill the same role, and thus give them appropriate care and attention.

## ENDNOTES

1. R. Jeffrey Smith and Julia Preston, "U.S. Plans Wider Role In U.N. Peace Keeping," *Washington Post*, June 18, 1993, p. A1.

2. For an explanation of this concern, see James H. Baker, "Peace Missions Dull the Army's Combat Edge," *Army Times*, December 6, 1993, p. 37.

3. Traditional peacekeeping operations were usually established by the Security Council; directed by the Secretary-General; established with the consent of the antagonists in a conflict; impartial; staffed by military personnel provided by a number of member states on a voluntary basis; lightly armed; and, authorized to use force only in self defense (Geoff Forrester, "Peacekeeping at the Crossroads," in Hugh Smith, ed., *Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future*, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1993. p. 3). For descriptions and analysis, see William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping*, New York: St. Martin's, 1992; Alan James, *Peacekeeping and International Politics*, London: Macmillan, 1990; Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993; and Augustus Richard Norton and Thomas George Weiss, *UN Peacekeepers: Soldiers With a Difference*, Headline Series No. 292, New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1990.

4. U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali established the policy framework for second generation peace operations. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, New York: United Nations, 1992; *idem*, "Empowering the United Nations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 5, Winter 1992/93, pp 89-102; *idem*, "An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later," *Orbis*, Vol. 37, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 323-332; and, *idem*, "Don't Make the U.N.'s Hard Job Harder," *New York Times*, August 20, 1993, p. A29. For analysis, see William J. Durch, *The United Nations and Collective Security in the 21st Century*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993; Ronald J. Fisher, "The Potential for Peacebuilding: Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking," *Peace and Change*, Vol. 18, No. 3, July 1993, pp. 247-266; Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 3, July 1993, pp. 451-464; John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 113-134; Michael Renner, *Critical Juncture: The Future of Peacekeeping*, Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1993; Thomas G. Weiss, ed. *Collective Security in a Changing World*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993; *idem*, "New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing an Agenda for Peace," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 51-66; and

Donald M. Snow, *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

5. Andrew S. Natsios, "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Intervention and U.S. Policy," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 130. On the distinction between second generation peace operations and peace enforcement, see Cathy Downes, "Challenges for Smaller Nations in the New Era of UN and Multinational Operations," in Smith, ed., *Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future*, pp. 20-27.

6. Thomas G. Weiss, "Intervention: Whither the United Nations?" *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 1994, pp. 109-128.

7. David Rogers, "House Strips Pentagon Budget of Funds For Future Peacekeeping Operations," *Wall Street Journal*, October 1, 1993, p. 4; and Dick Kirschten, "Missions Impossible," *National Journal*, October 30, 1993, pp. 2576-2579.

8. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Peace-Keeping: The Doctor Is Indisposed," *Washington Post*, January 14, 1994, p. A23.

9. Madeleine K. Albright, "Measured Success at the United Nations," *Washington Post*, January 6, 1994, p. A27. For details on wavering global support for peace operations, see Geraldine Brooks, "Peacekeeping Missions of U.N. Are Pursued On a Wing and a Prayer," *Wall Street Journal*, December 28, 1993, p. A1.

10. Paul Lewis, "Reluctant Warriors: U.N. Member States Retreat From Peacekeeping Roles," *New York Times*, December 12, 1993, p. 22; Brian Hall, "Blue Helmets," *New York Times Magazine*, January 2, 1994, pp. 19-29; and Richard Bernstein, "Sniping Is Growing at U.N.'s Weakness as a Peacekeeper," *New York Times*, June 21, 1993, p. A1. For detailed analysis of the potential shortcomings of multinational peace operations, see Laurence Martin, "Peacekeeping as a Growth Industry," *The National Interest*, Vol. 32, Summer 1993, pp. 3-11.

11. See Steven Metz, *The Future of the United Nations: Implications For Peace Operations*, Report of a Roundtable Sponsored by Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 5, 1993, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

12. UNTAC was fielded in 1992. By 1993 it included 21,100 personnel. The component, which was the largest, was commanded by Lieutenant General John Sanderson of Australia. Its mandate was to disarm warring factions, conduct elections, provide civil administration, and serve as humanitarian observers. 1993.)

13. *Peacekeeping* includes: "Non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense), that are undertaken by outside

forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute." *Peace enforcement* is: "A form of combat, armed intervention, or the threat of armed intervention, that is pursuant to international license authorizing the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions--the primary purpose of which is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly accepted by the international community." (Joint Pub 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*, Proposed Final, June 1993, p. GL-11).

14. For an assessment of the current Balkan conflict grounded in an analysis of its history, see William T. Johnsen, *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

15. On assessing the ripeness of conflicts for resolution, see Richard N. Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.

16. There were actually several Somalia operations beginning with Operation *Restore Hope*. By mid-1993, the U.N. Operational in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) included more than 16,000 personnel under the command of Lt. Gen Cevik Bir of Turkey. Its mission was to provide a buffer and humanitarian relief to limit hostilities during an indeterminate period. (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, *Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations, 1993*, report EUR 93-10008, May 1993.) All U.S. forces are scheduled to be withdrawn by March 31, 1994.

17. George Bush was, of course, the most important advocate of a special U.S. mission. Other supporters include Charles Krauthammer and Ben J. Wattenberg. Advocates of a more limited U.S. global role include Patrick J. Buchanan, Ted Galen Carpenter, and Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. On this debate, see the essays in Owen Harries, ed., *America's Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*, San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991.

18. The Joint Strategic Planning System is the formal means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, discharges his responsibility to give strategic plans and directions to the Armed Forces of the United States and to interact with other DOD systems. The JSCP furnishes guidance to the commanders of the unified and specified commands (CINCs) and the Chiefs of Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions resources to CINCs, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions. The JSCP offers a coherent framework for capabilities-based military

advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA). See AFSC (Armed Forces Staff College) Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide* 1993, pp. 5-4 through 5-10.

19. New national security strategies and national military strategies are being prepared to replace the 1993 version of the national security strategy and 1992 national military strategy. These will largely codify the series of key foreign policy speeches given by Clinton administration officials in September 1993. The administration is also developing official policy on peacekeeping. The policy statement, known as Presidential Decision Directive 13, has undergone several revisions and, by the end of 1993, was not yet approved. See Paul Lewis, "U.S. Plans Policy on Peacekeeping," *New York Times*, November 18, 1993, p. A7. Clinton policy on peacekeeping, including stipulations for U.S. involvement, was explained in a speech at the National War College by Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright. See John Mackinlay, "Problems for U.S. Forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping," in William H. Lewis, ed., *Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead?*, Report of a Special Conference, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1993, pp. 30-33.

20. Quoted in William H. Lewis, ed., *Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 1993, p. 41.

21. On the potential contributions of the other services, see Steven Metz, "The Air Force Role in United Nations Peacekeeping," *Airpower Journal*, Vol. VII, No. 4, Winter 1993, pp. 68-81; and George Allison, "The United States Navy and United Nations Peace-Keeping," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-35.

22. Many of these nations are currently capturing and analyzing their experience. For example, see Smith, ed., *Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future* which is an Australian collection with chapters by peacekeepers from Fiji, Singapore, and Thailand, and John Gardam, *The Canadian Peacekeeper*, Burnstown, Ontario: General Store Publishing House, 1993. The Department of Defense is also taking steps to better understand the approach of other nations. See the contract study *Preparations for Peacekeeping: A Survey of Nine Nations*, McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, August 1993.

23. The military is developing coordinated planning procedures. See United States Atlantic Command Air Land Sea Application Center, *Multi-Service Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, Worldwide Coordination Version 3, October 1993. @Chapternumber = APPENDIX

## ROUNDTABLE PARTICIPANTS

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